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The final months of direct United States military involvement in this nation's
longest war were marked by military operations which raised many fundamental
questions about the arrangement of the war powers between the executive and
legislative branches. These armed actions are particularly interesting to a stu-
dent of the constitutional allotment of warmaking and public defense powers,
since they represent the first major test of recent enactments of Congress in which
the legislative branch has sought to impose binding rules on the use of American
force abroad. One of these laws, the War Powers Resolution, seems to represent
a congressional will that the President not commit American military forces,
even in defense of American lives, liberty, and property, without first consulting
Congress. The President did, in fact, comply with the resolution and consult with
Congress during the recent operations, but what if he had not? Could Congress
lawfully prevent the President from acting unilaterally to defend American
interests abroad?
Numerous historical precedents since the Constitution was adopted suggest
that the President has power independent of Congress to commit American forces
for defensive purposes. The Founding Fathers, although fearful of a too powerful
Executive, were also well aware of the hazards of placing military operations
under the control of a legislative body; they drafted a Constitution that reflected
these concerns. While Congress cannot constitutionally legislate restrictions to
these independent defensive war powers, sufficient guarantees of accountability
are inherent in the constitutional system.
II. The War Powers Resolution and Its First Tests
A. Provisions of the War Powers Resolution
A history-making law, the War Powers Resolution' was enacted by Congress
on November 7, 1973, over President Nixon's veto. Never before had Congress
undertaken to codify or define rules applicable to the introduction of United
States armed forces into war or threatened war.
The announced purpose of the resolution, set forth in § 2(a), is to
insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President
will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities,
or in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated
* Counsel to United States Senator Barry M. Goldwater; former Assistant Counsel, Office
of Legislative Council, United States Senate; former Richardson Foundation Congressional
Fellow; J.D., Duke University, 1959; -A.B., Elon College, 1956.
1 Pub. L. No. 93-148; HJ. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1973).
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by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or
in such situations.
Section 2(c), described further herein, expresses a congressional understanding
that the "constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief" to
commit military forces exist only when: (1) Congress has declared war, (2)
legislated specific authority, or (3) the United States is under attack.2
Section 3 provides that the President will consult with Congress "in every
possible instance" before each use of armed forces in hostilities or threatened
hostilities and regularly thereafter, until United States forces are disengaged or
removed from such situations. The applicability of the resolution is initiated by
§ 4, which requires that, absent a declaration of war, whenever United States
armed forces are introduced (1) into hostilities or imminent hostilities; (2) into
the territory, air space, or waters of a foreign nation, when equipped for combat
(other than solely for the supply, replacement, repair or training of forces); or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States forces equipped for
combat already located in a foreign nation, the President must report it in writing
to Congress within 48 hours and periodically afterwards. It is significant that
situations (2) and (3) are not tied to the actual outbreak of or imminent involve-
ment in hostilities, but restrict the mere deployment of combat forces into another
country, whether or not hostilities might be anticipated. Even the strengthening
of units already located in foreign countries is similarly restricted.
Once the reporting provision has been triggered, § 5 takes effect. This
section mandates that no later than 60 days after a report is required, "the Pres-
ident shall terminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to which
such report was submitted (or required to be submitted)," unless Congress grants
specific authority for the operation to continue or "is physically unable to meet as
a result of an armed attack upon the United States." The 60-day period can be
extended for an additional 30 days if the President determines and certifies to
Congress that the safety of United States troops demands their continued use in
the course of bringing about their prompt removal. Next, § 5(c), an important
and often overlooked part of the war powers legislation, provides that at any
time United States forces "are engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the
United States, its possessions, and territories without a declaration of war or
specific statutory authorization, such forces shall be removed by the President if
the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution." This means that at any time
before the 60- to 90-day period is up, Congress can unilaterally order United
States forces to pull out. The law provides that the President must obey such a
congressional directive.
Sections 6 and 7 of the resolution establish congressional priority procedures
for consideration of, and final action upon, legislation introduced either to author-
2 Section 2(c) does not answer what the understanding of Congress is as to any assertions
of power which the President may make by virtue of his possession of the executive power of
the nation, his authorities over the conduct of foreign policy, or his right to enforce the duties
and obligations "growing out of the Constitution, our international relations, and all the pro-
tection implied by the nature of the Government under the Constitution." See text accom-
panying notes 69-80 infra.
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ize continued engagement of our forces or to compel their removal. Another
major policy provision is included in § 8, which states that no authority for the
use of troops shall be inferred from any provision of law, including defense ap-
propriations, unless the law spells out a specific intent to confer such authority
within the meaning of the resolution.3 Nor can any authority for troop deploy-
ment be inferred from any existing or future treaty, unless it is implemented by
separate legislation specifically conferring such authority. In somewhat of an anti-
climactic manner, Congress then declares in § 8(d) that nothing in the law "is
intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President,
or the provisions of existing treaties," or "shall be construed as granting any
authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces... which he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.'
The War Powers Resolution received its first tests during the closing months
of America's involvement in Indochina.
B. A Chronology of Presidential Military Initiatives in 1975
Four military operations which came under the purview of the War Powers
Resolution occurred in 1975. Three were rescue and evacuation efforts: (1)
the evacuation of Americans and others from Danang and other South Viet-
namese seaports imperiled by enemy forces; (2) the rescue of Americans and
others caught in Phnom Penh before the capture of the Cambodian capital by
the Communists; and (3) the evacuation of United States citizens and numerous
South Vietnamese during the dying hours of the Thieu government in Saigon.
Finally, there occurred the well-publicized Mayaguez incident, in which an
American ship and crewmen were rescued, and freedom of the seas for United
States vessels was upheld.
The first independent Presidential military activity of the year occurred on
March 29, 1975, when President Ford directed United States naval vessels to
asst in an international humanitarian relief effort to transport thousands of
refugees and some United States nationals to safety from Danang and elsewhere
in South Vietnam. American forces abroad were equipped for combat.5 One
week later, United States Marines in 36 helicopters flew into the Cambodian
capital of Phnom Penh, where they evacuated some 100 Americans, 160 Cam-
bodians, and 35 third-country nationals. A contingent of 350 Marines, in full
combat gear, participated in the operation, standing guard in the area where the
helicopters landed. Twenty United States warplanes patrolled the skies and
two helicopter gunships escorted the fleet. No casualties were incurred, but a
3 Implicit in this provision is the concept that because Congress funds a war does not
mean it wants to share responsibility for that war.
4 In this section, Congress appears to be admitting uncertainty about what it has done
elsewhere in the resolution and where the boundaries of the Constitution actually fall between
the President and Congress. On the one hand, Congress says the President can do whatever
the Constitution allows, regardless of what it may have mistakenly provided to the contrary.
On the other hand, it does not mean to authorize him to do anything he cannot now do, what-
ever that is. If nothing more, this provision invites competing interpretations of the war
powers allotment of the Constitution by the President and Congress.
5 121 CONG. R1cz. S 5279-80 (daily ed. Apr. 7, 1975).
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75 mm. recoilless rifle round and at least four rockets hit the landing field.'
By mid-April, President Ford had ordered the reduction of American per-
sonnel in the United States mission in Saigon to levels that could be quickly
evacuated during an emergency. On April 29, 1975, Tan Son Nhut Airfield in
Saigon came under rocket and artillery fire. Believing that the airfield was "un-
usable" by fixed wing aircraft and that "the collapse of the Government forces
within Saigon appeared imminent," the President decided that the "situation
presented a direct and imminent threat to the remaining United States citizens
and their dependents in and around Saigon." Accordingly, he ordered United
States military forces to proceed with "an emergency final evacuation out of
consideration for the safety of U.S. citizens." 7 In the final removal, approxi-
mately 5,600 Vietnamese and 1,375 Americans were evacuated from the embassy
by a fleet of 70 helicopters. In addition, over 30,000 Vietnamese refugees were
picked up on the open sea by Navy ships. American fighter aircraft provided
protective aircover and in at least one instance suppressed North Vietnamese
antiaircraft artillery firing upon evacuation helicopters. About 865 Marines
were involved in the operation. Two Marines and two pilots were killed in the
final withdrawal.'
Two weeks later, President Ford directed American forces to free the
unarmed American merchant vessel Mayaguez and its 39 American crew mem-
bers. The ship was seized May 12, 1975, by Cambodian Communist troops 60
miles from the Cambodian coast and seven miles from the disputed island of
Poulo Wai, claimed by both Cambodia and Vietnam. In a report to Congress
on the event, the President charged that the seizure of the ship was "in clear
violation of international law," and an "illegal and dangerous act."' The United
States had not recognized the claim of the Cambodians to the Wai Islands, nor
their claim to a territorial sea of more than three miles.'0
The American rescue effort involved the destruction or immobilization of
seven Cambodian patrol boats by United States aircraft on May 13; the mobi-
lization by the United States of eight ships, 11 helicopters, 25 planes, and 300
Marines; the assault on the island of Koh Tang by United States Marines on
May 14; and the successful recapture of the abandoned Mayaguez late that day.
One American plane dropped the biggest nonnuclear bomb in our arsenal on
Koh Tang. Other air attacks struck the military airfield at Ream and a main-
land Cambodian oil storage depot shortly after the crew had been released.
These missions were explained as necessary to protect Marines still left on Tang
Island. Fifteen United States servicemen are listed as dead and three missing in
action on and around that island."
6 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRis. Doc., Apr. 21, 1975, at 378; Wash. Post, Apr. 13, 1975,
at Al, A19; Wash. Post, Apr. 12, 1975, at Al, A-12.
7 H.R. Doc. No. 94-124, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 CONG. Rxc. 3609 (1975)
(remarks of Senator Eagleton).
8 Id.; Phila. Inquirer, June 8, 1975, at A-I, A-5; Wash. Star, May 2, 1975 at A-1, A-6.
9 11 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc., May 19, 1975, at 514-15.
10 See letter of Assistant Secretary of State Robert McCloskey to Senator Edward Brooke,
printed in 121 CONG. Rnc. S 11572-74 (daily ed. June 25, 1975).
11 See text of President Ford's letter on the Mayaguez affair, supra note 9; letter of
Assistant Secretary of State Robert McCloskey, supra note 10.
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C. Application of the War Powers Resolution
Did the President violate the law by any of these operations? In applying
the provisions of the War Powers Resolution to the facts of the 1975 Indochina
military actions, the first issue to be considered is the effect that should be given
to § 2(c). This provision spells out the congressional understanding that the
constitutional power of the President as Commander in Chief to introduce com-
bat forces into hostilities, or situations where hostilities are imminent, exists "only"
when Congress has declared war or granted specific statutory authority, or when
there is "a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its
territories or possessions, or its armed forces."
Is § 2(c) meant as a "legally" binding" definition? If it is binding, did the
facts of each evacuation and rescue mission fit the congressional understanding
of a situation where troops were introduced "into hostilities" or where their
"imminent involvement in hostilities" was clearly indicated? Notwithstanding
the restrictive language of § 2 (c), does the provision allow for an implied excep-
tion in order to evacuate American citizens? Does any such exception extend
far enough to encompass the humanitarian withdrawal of foreign nationals
in connection with the evacuation of Americans?
Certain portions of the legislative history of the War Powers Resolution
can be read to indicate that Congress intended § 2(c) to be a binding rule,
codifying the President's power as Commander in Chief in all situations involving
hostilities. 2 The weight of the evidence on congressional intent, however, points
to the conclusion that § 2(c) does not carry binding force. The State Depart-
ment claims the subsection is "at most a declaratory statement of policy," that
it "does not contain language which requires or prohibits any particular action,
which is characteristic of mandatory and binding provisions." An additional
point made by the State Department is that the conference report on the War
Powers Resolution expressly provides that "[s]ubsequent sections of the Joint
Resolution are not dependent upon the language of this subsection. . .. ""
To the considerations posed by the State Department may be added the
fact that the primary object of the War Powers Resolution was to "insure that
the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President" will apply to
certain crisis situations involving armed action or its grave threat. 4 The pro-
visions of the resolution which implement congressional participation in decision-
making relating to employing the Armed Forces are not found in § 2(c), but
rather in other sections of the resolution which establish a process of consultation,
reporting, and prompt congressional action on these matters." Since it is not
necessary for § 2(c) to have a binding effect in order to carry out Congress' role
in the "collective judgment" process, it can be concluded that the section is not
an effort at legislating a legally binding limitation on Presidential authority.
Even if § 2(c) were assumed to be an operative rule for the use of the
Armed Forces in grave situations, the omission of any specific language regarding
12 119 CONG. REc. 33550 (1973) (remarks of Senator Javits).
13 119 CONG. Rac. 40022-23 (1973) (remarks of Senator Eagleton).
14 H.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., § 2(a) (1973).
15 Id. §§ 4-7.
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the protection of United States citizens overseas does not mean that emergency
rescue operations are prohibited. The War Powers Resolution was passed over
the President's veto in an atmosphere of concern that United States forces might
be reintroduced into the Vietnam war to enforce the Paris Cease Fire Agree-
ment of January 24, 1973,16 or that on other pretexts the President might resume
bombing missions or active American fighting in support of the South Vietnamese
regime.' In this setting, the term "hostilities" or "imminent involvement in
hostilities," for purposes of the presumed limitations of § 2(c), would include
only actions where a principal aim is to destroy enemy troops or resources, or
otherwise strengthen the lasting ability of an ally. Without specific and convinc-
ing evidence of Congress' deliberate purpose to bar such an activity, it cannot
be presumed that Congress intended to prohibit a humanitarian action reason-
ably related to protecting the safety of endangered Americans. 8
Moreover, there is specific legislative history to the effect that Congress did
recognize that the President possesses an inherent constitutional power to employ
the Armed Forces to protect United States citizens. During Senate debate over
the final version of the War Powers Resolution that had been agreed to in joint
conference between the House and Senate, Senator Javits, an initial author of
the legislation and then manager of the proposal, discussed exactly this point in
a colloquy with Senator Eagleton of Missouri. "[T]he Senator has laid great
emphasis on the word 'only,'" noted Senator Eagleton. "I take it that the
Senator's current position is that under the Constitution the President has no
emergency authority with respect to American nationals endangered abroad."' 9
"I said no such thing," replied the Senator from New York. "I would tell the
Senator this," he added: "There was a very long argument about including
the concept of rescuing nationals. It was felt that whatever was specified on that
score, in order to be conservative in respect of the President's power, would have
to be so hedged and qualified that we were better off just not saying it ... ."
Senator Javits' answer makes it clear the conferees did recognize the ex-
istence of a rescue power in the President. But to avoid the difficult and perhaps
impossible task of nailing down a definition of executive authority, they left the
16 The text of the Vietnam Ceasefire Agreement and Protocols is printed in 31 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 151-64 (1973).
17 See brief summary of the congressional attitude regarding the Indochina war in 33
CONG. Q. WEEKLY RPm. 842-46 (1975).
18 The same analysis would apply to seven other laws which seek to prohibit the use of
appropriated funds to finance certain military activities in, over, or from off the shores of
North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia. Four of these prohibitions bar the use
of funds to finance "directly or indirectly combat activities" by the Armed Forces. (Section
839 of Pub. L. No. 93-437; section 741 of Pub. L. No. 93-238; section 108 of Pub. L. No. 93-
52; and section 307 of Pub. L. No. 93-50). One prohibits the use of money to "finance mili-
tary or para-military operations." (Section 30 of Pub. L. No. 93-189). Two laws prohibit the
use of funds to finance "the involvement of United States military forces in hostilities." (Sec-
tion 806 of Pub. L. No. 93-115 and section 13 of Pub. L. No. 93-126.) These seven restrictions
were enacted because of concern with the possible use of the armed forces to support the
Government of South Vietnam or Cambodia. The employment of the military in the Cam-
bodian and Vietnam evacuations and the recapture of the Mayaguez have little or no bearing
on the matter of aid to the Cambodian or South Vietnam regimes and were initiated for the
primary purposes of protecting U.S. citizens and assisting in international humanitarian relief.
Thus, the operations were not restricted by any of the above appropriations riders.
19 119 CONG. Rnc. 33558 (1973) (remarks of Senator Eagleton).
20 Id.
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matter open for interpretation by the President and Congress as future practice
might require. If instead of relying on his sole judgment of what may be war-
ranted by particular circumstances, the President wishes to obtain a clarification
or support of his power to act, Senator Javits explained: "He can always come
to us for authority if he is in any doubt."'"
Having concluded first that § 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution does not
contain a legally binding definition of the President's powers as Commander in
Chief, and, second, that in any event humanitarian relief missions involving in
part the rescue of Americans are excepted from any limitations intended by such
section, it is clear the President did not violate the War Powers Resolution in the
course of the Indochina operations. All that was required was the consultation
and reporting required by §§ 3 and 4 of the resolution, and this the President
did.
President Ford not only consulted with Congress by bringing before both
Houses in joint session on April 10, 1975, the need for the possible evacuation of
Americans and Vietnamese, but he requested support from Congress in the form
of related legislation which would demonstrate unity among the two political
branches of government on this important matter of national policy.22 He also
mentioned the urgency of the situation in Cambodia.23 On April 14, President
Ford, with Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, and
Army Chief of Staff Weyand, met personally with the full Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee for consultation on the situation in Southeast Asia. Top admini-
stration officials also testified before several congressional committees to discuss
the evacuation issue.2
The same spirit of collaboration, to the degree possible, marked the Mayaguez
incident. Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser to the State Department, informed a
House subcommittee investigating the application of the War Powers Resolution
to the event "that although the Mayaguez incident was a rapidly unfolding
emergency situation, four separate sets of communications took place between
the Executive Branch and the Congressional leadership."25 He summarized these
consultations as follows: "First, the Congressional leadership was informed of the
principal military operations prior to the actual commencement of those opera-
tions; second, the Congressional leadership did have an opportunity to express its
views concerning the impending military operations; . . . and third all views
which were expressed by the Congressional leadership .. .were communicated
directly to the President."26
21 Id.
22 121 CONG. Rc. H 2684 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1975). It is interesting that the President
commenced and completed the Indochina evacuations even though Congress did not provide
him with the supporting legislation he had requested. In fact, on May 1, 1975, after the last
evacuation, the House of Representatives rejected the conference report on this measure, H.R.
6096, the Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975, which would have
provided statutory authority for the President to do exactly what he had already done. 121
CoNG. REc. 3540-51 (daily ed. May 1, 1975).
23 121 CoNG. Rnc. H 2684 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1975).
24 33 CONG. Q. WEEKLY Rnp. 776-78 (1975).
25 Hearings on War Powers: A Test of Compliance Before the Subcomm. on International
Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 78 (1975) [hereinafter cited as War Powers Hearings].
26 Id. at 77-78.
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Dissenting voices were heard. Senator Eagleton complained that "[a]t most
a number of Senators and Congressmen were notified or informed of action
already planned or underway."2 He introduced an amendment that would
replace the phrase "consult with Congress" in § 3 of the War Powers Resolution
with the words "seek the advice and counsel of Congress."2 This he would
define to mean that the President "shall in every possible instance discuss fully the
proposed decision for using [the] Armed Forces with Members of Congress...
and shall fully consider their advice and counsel before committing the United
States Armed Forces to any such proposed decision."2
Senator Javits took a similar view. He informed the same House panel
that the State Department Legal Adviser appeared before that "[t]o a disturb-
ing extent, consultations with the Congress prior to the Mayaguez incident
resembled the old, discredited practice of informing selected members of Congress
a few hours in advance of the implementation of decisions already taken within
the Executive Branch." He proposed that "prior consultations required under the
law should be conducted with the committees having legislative jurisdiction-
meeting in their formal capacities as committees of the Senate and House of
Representatives."'" By this description, Senator Javits meant the 17-member
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the 37-member House International
Affairs Committee, sitting in full session. 1
Pressed as to his view of the form consultation should have taken, Mike
Mansfield, the Majority Leader of the Senate, stated that the consultative process
should be applied to "at least the leadership and the chairmen and the ranking
Republican Members."" Although he professed not to have been consulted, re-
ferring to "briefings" rather than "consultation," Senator Mansfield did not
agree with a reporter's description that the law had been "to a slight extent, bent
or violated," explaining that "maybe he didn't have the time."" This point was
forcefully used by Monroe Leigh, who testified that "one must consider the other
things that the Chief Executive had to do to discharge his obligations under the
Constitution."' 4
How the President could have cooperated more fully with Congress than
he did in the circumstances of rapidly changing and developing events, each
of which could be seen as a new reason for consulting with Congress, is un-
explained by his critics. The answer to this practical problem surely lies in a com-
mon sense approach based on Congress' own phrase, "in every possible instance,"
27 121 CONG. RFc. S 8826 (daily ed. May 21, 1975). Earlier, Senator Eagleton had
complained that Congress had not been informed in any way about an incident which he believes
was the first test case for the War Powers Resolution, the evacuation of more than 500 Amer-
icans from Cyprus in two military helicopter operations on July 22 and 23, 1974. 120 CONG.
REc. S 13851-53 (daily ed. July 31, 1974). The executive branch denied there had been a
failure of reporting since our forces "were unarmed." 120 CONG. REc. S 14180 (daily ed.
Aug. 2, 1974).
28 The amendment is proposed in S. 1790, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(1) (1974).
29 S. 1790, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(3) (1974).
30 War Powers Hearings, supra note 25, at 79.
31 Id. at 68.
32 Senator Mansfield's remarks were made during an interview on "Face the Nation," the
pertinent part of which is printed in 121 CONG. REG. S 8819 (daily ed. May 21, 1975).
33 Id.
34 War Powers Hearings, supra note 25, at 79.
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which admits of circumstances where lengthy dialogues between the President and
some 50 to 60 members of two congressional committees simply cannot take
place."5
III. The Independent War Powers of the Executive
Given that President Ford did not violate any provision of the War Powers
Resolution in the course of the four Indochina military actions of 1975, the
question arises of what constitutional validity the resolution would have in the
case of Presidential noncompliance. Does Congress possess constitutional author-
ity to prohibit the President from using the Armed Forces in defense of American
lives, liberty, and property without first obtaining the collective judgment of both
Houses of Congress? Should an incident arise where the President and Congress
differ over the need for an armed response, will the Executive be able as a matter
of constitutional law to carry on a defense mission which Congress has ordered
him to call off? For example, if Congress fears that a contemplated rescue mission
involves a risk to the public in general that outweighs the safety of those Amer-
icans immediately involved, is the President constitutionally bound to abandon
those Americans when so directed by a concurrent resolution agreed to under
§ 5 (c) of the War Powers Resolution? Or may he undertake the operation by
virtue of distinct and independent authorities vested in the President by the
Constitution?
A. Historical Incidents of Defensive Presidential War-Making
History throws considerable light on these questions. Our past is replete with
incidents involving threats to American lives, property, or important American
overseas interests in which Presidents have used force or the threat of force for
defensive purposes without a declaration of war and without policy restriction by
Congress.
It is not surprising that force was not used abroad during the terms of our
first President. With no Navy and a regular Army which never exceeded 4,100
men,36 President Washington could not have mounted an overseas war under
any circumstances. With the influence arising from the nation's potential great-
ness, based on an immense land area and a growing population, he could and
did, however, threaten the use of force as an arm of diplomacy when an op-
portune moment arose. Such an occasion presented itself in 1790, when Spain
35 E.g., as explained by the State Department Legal Adviser:
To comply with the 48-hour requirement in the last report which concerned the
Mayaguez affair, the President had to be awakened at 2 o'clock in the morning in
order to read and sign his report so that it could be delivered to the Speaker and the
President Pro Tempore of the Senate. These deliveries were made to the offices of the
Speaker and President Pro Tempore at approximately 2:30 A.M. on May 15 about
four hours before the expiration of the 48-hour period.
Id. at 72.
36 Letter from U.S. Center of Military History, Dep't. of Army, to Barry M. Goldwater,
Sept. 19, 1975. See C. PAULLIN, ISTORY oF NAvAL. ADMINISTRATION 1775-1911, at 53, 89
(1968). The Navy under the Constitution began with the Act of March 27, 1794, which
authorized construction of four ships of 44 guns each and two of 36 guns each. Only three of
the ships were completed, and even these were not launched until after Washington's second
term had expired. Id. at 91, 97.
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and England appeared to be on the verge of war. The Spanish Colony of New
Orleans, and other Spanish posts to the north, were vulnerable to attack by a
British operation from Detroit, a danger known by both Washington and the
Spanish. Acting on Spanish fear of the British, Washington unilaterally pressured
Spain to open the Mississippi to American navigation, an important foreign
policy goal of his administration. Thomas Jefferson, as Secretary of State, im-
plemented Washington's plan by instructing the American envoy in Spain to
threaten that if the United States could not secure navigation down the Missis-
sippi by negotiation, it would acquire it by force, perhaps in alliance with
Britain.37 The threatened hostilities did not erupt, but Washington had shown
his readiness to take action independent of Congress when a vital interest of the
nation was at stake.
Washington's successor, John Adams, moved a step further toward the
actual commencement of hostilities for reasons of national defense. On March 19,
1798, he issued an order, without the authority of Congress, allowing American
merchant vessels to arm for defense against attacks by French warships.3" The
consensus of congressional debate on arming our merchantmen, which had oc-
curred only three days preceding Adams' order, was that "any new measures
ought [not] to be gone into, or measures which, in their tendency, must lead to
war.13 9 His action was promptly questioned by Congress on the ground that if
the President could take the measures which he had taken, "[h]e, and not
37 3 J. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON 256-58 (1970); D. MALONE, JFFERSON AND THE
RIGHTS OF MAN 311 (1951); 5 J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 238-39
(AMS Press ed. 1969).
There is at least one other example when the first President was willing to use armed force
at his own discretion. In fact, he was prepared to use it against the apparent contrary judg-
ment of Congress. Leading up to Washington's action was the scheming of "Citizen" Genet,
who "deliberately planned two expeditions, to be carried on from the territories of the United
States against the dominions of Spain, and had, as minister of the French republic, granted
commissions to citizens of the United States, who were privately recruiting troops for the
proposed service." MARSHALL at 468. These regiments were being recruited in Georgia,
South Carolina, and Kentucky to attack the Spanish possessions at the mouth of the Missis-
sippi and in Florida. 4 J. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON 50-53 (1972).
The Federalists reacted by introducing and passing a bill in the Senate forbidding filibuster-
ing expeditions against persons at peace with the United States. The House refused to follow
the Senate's lead. "To achieve, despite Congress's unwillingness to act, what he considered
essential for peace, he issued his executive proclamation." Id. at 127. This was the
Proclamation of March 24, 1794, warning against enlisting citizens for the purpose of invading
the territories of a nation at peace with the United States and requiring all citizens to refrain
from engaging in such unlawful purposes, sometimes called Washington's Second Neutrality
Proclamation. "He went, indeed, further," directing General Wayne "to post troops where
they could intercept any filibustering expedition that tried to float down the Ohio." Id. Not
only was Washington ready to enforce his decision of neutrality as between Spain and France
on his own authority after he could not persuade Congress to act, but he used Wayne's army
for a purpose totally different than the one Congress had intended, a campaign against Indian
war parties in the North. Id. at 49.
38 8 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1271 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1851). On May 22, 1798,
Adams' Secretary of War, James McHenry, moved the nation closer to war by instructing Navy
Captain Richard Dale to convoy our merchantmen in coming in or going off the coast between
the Capes of Virginia and Long Island and, if attacked while on the high seas, "to defend
Yourself to the Utmost." NAVAL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE QUASI-WAR BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND FRANcF 77 (U.S. Office of Naval Records & Library 1935). Dale's
orders were limited to repelling force by force primarily for political reasons. McHenry, and
Alexander Hamilton, whose advice he had solicited, correctly foresaw that Congress would be
induced to respond with its approval of even stronger measures than Adams had taken, thereby
sharing responsibility for the military actions likely to ensue.
39 Id. at 1254-63.
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Congress, had the power of making war." 40 The matter was debated fully, but
Congress rejected any legislation that would have regulated the President's action.
The House also defeated amendments which proposed to limit the manner in
which the President could employ our small naval force.41
From the published debates, it is clear that this early Congress distinguished
between offensive and defensive military measures, recognizing that the President
can take proper actions for the defense of the country, without direction from
Congress. 2 During a continuation of this debate, Representative Jonathan
Dayton, then the Speaker of the House and a signer of the Constitution, argued
that the President, as Commander in Chief, was the official "whom the Constitu-
tion has made exclusively the judge" of employing the Army and Navy of the
United States wherever he "thought the common defense and general welfare
required them to be stationed."43 The President was also supported by Repre-
sentative Sewall, who ridiculed the idea that "[o]ur citizens going without the
territory of the United States are to be no longer objects of our attention" and
"were to be abandoned to the elements or to the hostility of mankind, wherever
they went."44
This view of the President's responsibility for the public safety as primary
has since been followed by nearly every President. Only three years later, Thomas
Jefferson sent into the Mediterranean on his own authority a squadron of four
ships, with instructions that should hostilities be commenced by the Barbary
pirates upon American shipping before the squadron's arrival, "this force will be
immediately employed in the defense and protection of our commerce ....
His orders provided that pirate attacks against American shipping will be "re-
pelled and punished." It was only after actual fighting broke out that Jefferson
came to Congress for support." Even President Buchanan, who is cited in a
40 Id. at 1324.
41 Id. at 1459, 1462, 1521.
42 Id. at 1325, 1330.
43 Id. at 1410, 1454-55.
44 Id. at 1457-58.
45 2 Ass. STATE PAPERS, CLASS I, FOREIGN RELATIONS 347-48 (1930); Sofaer, Book
Review, 88 IARv. L. Rv. 286 (1974).
Early in 1802, Jefferson again acted on his own authority without notifying Congress
in a military matter of serious consequence. Having learned of the scheduled cession of
Louisiana by Spain to France and the closure of the deposit at New Orleans, Jefferson
threatened the French charg6 in America with an Anglo-American military alliance if France
took possession of Louisiana. Also, he warned that the French could remain in the territory
"only so long as the Americans would permit." He then confirmed this threat by writing a
private letter to Robert Livingston, the U.S. minister in France, explicitly referring to war
as a means of rejecting France from the New World. When the House of Representatives called
upon him for all the official papers bearing on developments in New Orleans, Jefferson kept
this letter a secret from Congress. D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM,
1801-1805, at 240, 253-56, 264 (1970).
46 Jefferson's idea of the way "to protect our commerce & chastise their insolence," in
case the Barbary Powers have declared war or committed hostilities, as stated in his orders to
Captain Dale, was "by sinking, burning or destroying their ships & vessels wherever you shall
find them." 1 NAVAL DOCUMENTS RELATED TO THE UNITED STATES WAR WITH THE
BARBARY POWERS 467 '(1939).
During a discussion between Jefferson and his Cabinet on sending the squadron to cruise
in the Mediterranean, Jefferson records that his Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Gal-
latin, a strict constructionist, advised: "The exve can not put us in a state of war, but if we
be put into that state either by the decree of Congress or of the other nation, the command and
direction of the public force then belongs to the exve." 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFER-
SON 293 (P. Ford ed. 1892) (emphasis added).
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recent report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as acknowledging
the war power of Congress,4 7 risked a confrontation with Great Britain by order-
ing, upon his own authority, a naval force "to protect all vessels of the United
States on the high seas from search or detention by the vessels of war of any
other nation."4 A conflict was avoided at the last moment when Great Britain,
because of this pressure, abandoned its claim to the right of boarding and search-
ing American merchant vessels.49
President Grant, who is described by a prominent historian as having
"politely deferred" to Congress after being rebuffed by the Senate in his attempt
to annex Santo Domingo,0 nevertheless put the Navy on a warfooting, upon his
sole authority, in a confrontation with Spain concerning the seizure, court-martial,
and execution of 53 crew members and passengers of the American steamer
Virginius. According to contemporary reports, every available ship was com-
missioned or recalled from foreign stations, and war appeared imminent. Grant's
use of force succeeded: Spain yielded, returned the Virginius with her surviving
crew and passengers, and paid an indemnity to the United States.5'
During the early 1800's, American gunboats thus protected American
shipping in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and made several landings on foreign
soil to protect American lives and property. By the 1850's these protective actions
extended to the Pacific, culminating in President McKinley sending 5,000 troops
in 1900 to defend the American Legation in Peking. In the early 1900's, Amer-
ican forces repeatedly protected American property in Panama and other
Caribbean areas, and made several landings in China. By 1927, this country
had 5,670 troops stationed in China. Prior to our official entry into World War
II, President Roosevelt, without consulting Congress, sent troops to occupy
Greenland and Iceland and ordered United States warships to protect the British
lifeline in the Atlantic. Since World War II, the United States has been involved
in major land wars in Korea and Indochina, has risked a nuclear holocaust in
order to remove offensive missiles from Cuba, and has placed the Armed Forces
on a worldwide military alert to prevent the Soviet Union from intervening in
the Middle East. 2
Presidents have deployed troops into crisis areas and used force or the threat
of force for defensive purposes without a declaration of war or other specific
authorization by Congress on approximately 200 occasions since the founding of
the Republic.3 The import and "quality" of these precedents, however, are
challenged by a distinguished historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., on the ground
47 S. REP. No. 93-220, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973).
48 7 J. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
3038 (1897).
49 C. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 51 (1921).
50 A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 86 (Popular Library ed. 1974).
51 F. CHADWICK, THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN 314-51 (1909).
52 See generally the chronological list in Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. VA. L.
REv. 53, 88-110, 367 (1972), as reprinted with supplementary data in Hearings on S. 440,
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 126-48 (1973). See
also M. KALB & B. KALE, KISSINGER 488-99 (1974), regarding the 1973 Middle East crisis.
53 Emerson, supra note 52, at 155-56. Up to 81 military operations may be supported by
legislation other than declarations of war, if authority to use force can be inferred from treaties.
But such action by the Senate alone would not constitute any precedent for requiring the
consent of both the Senate and House in other circumstances.
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that "the operations were mostly directed against nongovernmental groups,
mostly concerned with the protection of American citizens and mostly trivial."
Such "police actions, not directed at sovereign states," can be explained as not
rising "to the dignity of formal congressional concern."54 Moreover, Schlesinger
indicates: "A substantial number took place.., without presidential authoriza-
tion, very often the consequence of the individual initiative or short temper of
lieutenants along the southern border or commodores on the high seas."55
This analysis misses the practical answer that Presidents have consistently
responded to foreign threats to the United States with the force necessary, and
physically and technologically available, at a given moment in history. "When
little force was needed... little was used; when larger commitments were neces-
sary, they too were forthcoming."" President Washington did not hesitate to
threaten Spain with hostilities. President Adams risked a deeper war with France
by withdrawing his previous order that had forbidden the arming of merchant
vessels. President Buchanan accepted the chance of a conflict with Great Britain
in upholding the right of United States vessels to be free from search or detention
by foreign warships.
Furthermore, precedents of Presidential military activity cannot be uniformly
categorized as actions against "stateless and lawless people"; there are too many
exceptions. Even if accurate, this categorization is not of any major import. The
flow of blood is the same whether from combat with pirates and unruly natives,
or with regular forces. Any commitment of American forces into troubled areas
involves a serious risk of armed fighting. Nothing in the 18th century materials
regarding the war powers indicates that the framers made a distinction between
hostilities with organized states and nongovernment groups in the allotment of
those powers; nor is there a history of practice by Presidents showing they have
made such an interpretation of their powers. It is true that Presidential initiatives
with respect to formal states have increased notably in the 20th century, but this is
surely the result of the increase in the number of nation-states and the persistent
development of ways in which the United States can be affected by events abroad.
One must assume the Constitution never accommodates changes in history or
technology for the difference to become significant. Under such an assumption,
the United States Air Force would have no constitutional basis, for the Constitu-
tion provides for raising "Armies" and maintaining a "Navy," but nowhere
refers to an Air Force.
The inference that most precedents of Presidential war powers are the result
of hotheaded military officers on the scene is not supported by close examination
of the incidents. In fact, only a fraction of all the incidents have been sub-
sequently disavowed or repudiated by the Executive.5" Where actions may have
been commenced by individual commanders, they were carried out according to
what was believed to be a clear Presidential directive or policy.5" In any event, it
54 SCHLESINGER, supra note 50, at 61-62.
55 Id. at 62.
56 Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U.L. Rav. 27 (1970).
57 Emerson, supra note 52, at 110.
58 Goldwater, The President's Ability to Protect America's Freedoms-The Warmaking
Power, 1971 LAw & THE SocIAL OmR 444 n.141.
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is the President as Commander in Chief who is responsible for the command of
forces and the conduct of military operations. In practice, the President acts
through the executive departments and subordinate officers, and unless dis-
avowed, " their acts are in legal contemplation the acts of the President.
B. Constitutional Significance of Precedents
Accepting the existence of a nearly uniform practice of Presidents to use
armed force or the threat of it in furtherance of important defense interests,
without the specific approval of Congress, the question arises of what bearing
historical practice has upon current constitutional construction.
In the words of Justice Story, "the most unexceptionable source of collateral
interpretation is from the practical exposition of the government itself, in its vari-
ous departments, upon particular questions discussed, and settled upon its own-
intrinsic merits."6 A leading present-day authority on the legal aspects of foreign.
affairs writes that:
[T]he emphasis upon usage, as a test of constitutionality... was based upon
the notions that a people's genuine "constitution" is in how they live and co-
operate under a basic charter and that the most important authority in a
democratic community is in the expectations that people create in each
other by such living and cooperation. The most important principle of
interpretation in any legal system I have studied is that which requires ex-
amination of "subsequent conduct" as an index of contemporary expecta-
tion. 6 1
Usage was decisive in resolving an early separation of powers issue between
two branches of government. In 1802 the Congress enacted the Judiciary Act,
which continued the former practice of the Supreme Court Justices riding circuit.
Chief Justice Marshall promptly wrote letters to the Associate Justices stating that
he doubted the constitutionality of this provision, upon the ground that the Con-
stitution required separate appointments for holding circuit court. He suggested
the possibility that his colleagues refuse to carry out the law.62 Even with such
a serious cloud of doubt over Congress' authority to require additional judicial
duties of the Justices, especially without specific commissions to do so, the
Marshall Court abided by the principle of usage:
To this objection, which is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that
practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing
with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer,
and has indeed fixed the construction.63
59 United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291, 301 (1842); Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 496, 512 (1839); BERDAHL, supra note 49, at 21; D. WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 914 (1910).
60 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 409, at 392 (1833).
61 Letter from Professor Myers McDougal to Barry M. Goldwater, Jan. 12, 1973.
62 L. BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL 378-81 '(1974).
63 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 298, 308 (1803). Marshall did not participate in
the decision. Practice also served as the decisive evidence of interpreting the Constitution in
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27, 35-36 (1892).
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Usage has also been accepted by the Supreme Court on at least two oc-
casions as a basis for rejecting congressional attempts to reverse its earlier ideas
of executive authority. In United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,6 the Court ap-
proved the validity of a long-continued practice of the President to withdraw
public land from private acquisition even though this conflicted with a federal
statute which made such lands free and open to occupation and purchase. That
practice fixed the construction, the Court explained, "is not reasoning in a
circle but the basis of a wise and quieting rule that in determining the meaning
of a statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the usage itself-
even when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation."65 A decade
later the Court again relied on usage as a basis for rejecting congressional control
over the Presidency. In holding that Congress could not alter 73 years of prior
practice to begin setting conditions on the removal of executive officers by the
President, even though such practice had often been the subject of bitter con-
troversy in the past, the Court ruled:
Nor can we concur... that when Congress, after full consideration and with
the acquiescence and long practice of all the branches of the Government,
has established the construction of the Constitution, it may by its mere
subsequent legislation reverse such construction. It is not given power by
itself thus to amend the Constitution.66
The facts of these two cases closely parallel debate over the military com-
mand powers. Here there are over 185 years of practice in which Presidents
have reacted on their own initiative to any crisis which they believed might
present an unacceptable threat to the national safety. Many Presidents have been
criticized by both Houses for taking these strong military actions." But Congress
had never once before the 1970's passed a law prohibiting, or ordering a halt to,
any of these conflicts.6s If the rule of the above cases is applicable, Congress
cannot now, after full consideration and acquiescence for almost two centuries,
reverse the construction of the Constitution which has become so firmly set.
C. Constitutional Source of President's Powers
The President need not rely solely upon practice to establish his authority to
use armed forces in certain instances. The basic source of his power is the Con-
stitution itself. First, article II of the Constitution states that "[tihe Executive
power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." There is
authority for the proposition that this is not a passive grant, but includes the
traditional power of protecting the national safety as historically recognized by
the law of nations.69 For example, an edition of Vattel, circulated among leaders
64 236 U.S. 459, 473 (1915).
65 Id. at 472-73 (emphasis added).
66 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 152, 175 (1926).
67 Goldwater, supra note 58, at 426-28.
68 Emerson, War Powers: An Invasion of Presidential Prerogative, 58 A.B.A.J. 809,
813-14 "(1972).
69 See address of then Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold, printed in 117 CoNo. R ac.
28976-78 (1971) (remarks of Senator Javits).
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of the American Revolution by Benjamin Franklin," states the rule that the
Executive ought "to watch for the nation, and take care to preserve it... and
to secure it, as far as possible, against everything that threatens its safety or its
happiness. Hence all the rights which a nation derives from its obligation to
preserve and protect itself... reside in the [Executive.]""1
Second, the President is "the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,
and its sole representative with foreign nations.""2 At least six of the present
members of the Supreme Court have accepted Chief Justice Marshall's descrip-
tion of executive power to mean that the President has "primary responsibility
for the conduct of foreign affairs." For example, Justice Stewart, joined by
Justice White, stated the Constitution endows the President with "a large degree
of unshared power in the conduct of foreign affairs and the maintenance of our
national defense .... ."" Marshall's quote also is cited with approval in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 4 where it is stated that the power of the
President in the field of international relations is "delicate, plenary and exclusive"
and "does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress."7 5
70 2 B. FRANKLIN, THE LIFE OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 349 (J. Bigelow ed. 1874).
71 E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 14, 15 (1863). See also 2 . WOLFF, THE LAW
OF NATIONS TREATED ACCORDING TO A SCIENTIFIC METHOD § 39, at 26 (1934 reprint of ed.
1764). The framers also had before them the instruction of Thomas Rutherforth, who, while
he dissented from an opinion that "the external executive power" is "from its own nature"
independent of control by the legislature, nevertheless concluded that in those societies "where
the legislative and the executive power are lodged in different hands," and especially where
the legislative power resides "in a considerable number of representatives," the usual practice
"is to allow some degree of discretionary power in respect of war or peace" to the executive.
2 T. RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 54-56, 59 (Cambridge ed. 1756).
72 So said John Marshall, on March 7, 1800, while a member of the House of Repre-
sentatives. 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 613 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1851).
73 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart & White,
JJ., concurring). Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his concurring opinion in the same case, said
that "it is beyond cavil that the President has broad powers by virtue of his primary respon-
sibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs and his position as Commander-in-Chief." Id. at
741. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in that case, stated: "Article II of the great document vests
in the Executive Branch primary power over the conduct of foreign affairs and places in that
branch the responsibility for the Nation's safety." Id. at 761. Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Chief Justice Berger and Justice White, writes of the "primacy of the Executive in the
conduct of foreign relations" and "the lead role of the Executive in foreign policy," in First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional De Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 (1972).
74 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
75 Id. The well-known Neutrality Proclamation of 1793 by President Washington is com-
monly cited as the first major action which set the doctrine of Presidential responsibility for
determining on foreign policy. E.g., C. ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 84-85 (1964). The actual facts of the matter bear out its significance. Washington's
policy arose out of the French Revolution and the declaration of war made by France against
Great Britain, Holland, and Russia. As American vessels were being designated by French
representatives in the United States as privateers against British merchant shipping, we were
in "the most extreme danger of being drawn into the war." 4 A. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASH-
INGTON 26 (1970).
Even before word of these declarations reached him, Washington had decided upon and
often avowed a fixed purpose of maintaining "the neutrality of the United States, however gen-
eral the war might be in Europe." On the 12th of April, 1793, he reasserted this policy in
similar letters to Jefferson and Hamilton: "War having actually commenced between France
and Great Britain, it behoves the government of this country to use all the means in its power to
prevent the citizens thereof from embroiling us with either of those powers, by endeavouring
to maintain a strict neutrality." MARSHALL, supra note 37, at 326-28. Six days later, he ad-
dressed a circular letter to all his Cabinet members, enclosing for their consideration "a series
of questions, the answers to which would form a complete system" by which to implement his
policy. Id. at 328-29. Among other things, the meeting of the heads of departments led to
the issuance of a proclamation "forbidding the citizens of the United States to take part in
any hostilities on the seas, with or against any of the belligerent powers . . . and enjoining
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Third, § 2 of article II designates the President as "Commander in Chief."
This title has been defined as encompassing "the conduct of all military operations
in time of peace and of war, thus embracing control of the disposition of troops,
the direction of vessels of war and the planning and execution of cam-
paigns .. . ."' Nor has the Commander in Chief power been discovered only
recently as a functional base for the President's authority. His right to use force
"in such manner as, in his judgment, the public good.., might require," was
specifically made the subject of congressional debate, and was ultimately ac-
cepted by the Congress, as early as 1798.Y"
Fourth, § 3 of article II vests in the President the duty and right to "take
care that the laws be faithfully executed." The Supreme Court has construed
this power to include enforcement not only of statutes and treaties, but also of
"the rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our
international relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the gov-
ernment under the Constitution. 78
Fifth, the President could view his oath of office, to "preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution of the United States, ' 79 as both reinforcing executive
powers found elsewhere in the Constitution and possibly standing alone as a
source of power. "A Constitution which does not permit the Commander in
Chief to order belligerent acts whenever they are deemed necessary to defend
the interests of the nation, would be less an instrument intended to endure
through the ages, than a suicide pact."8 "
them from all acts inconsistent with the duties of a friendly nation towards those at war."
Id. at 330-31.
Although it was decided upon not to use the word "neutrality," the proclamation declared
what was in effect neutrality and was but one means of reaffirming the policy of neutrality that
Washington had previously made. "Being at variance with the prejudices, the feelings, and
the passions of a large portion of the society, and being predicated on no previous proceedings
of the legislature," it is a powerful example of a President making foreign policy for the
nation, in conflict with the passions of the moment, in order to protect the safety of the
nation. Id. at 334.
Washington's proclamation was signed on April 22, 1793. It is important to distinguish
the policy of neutrality and the proclamation from the separate rules regarding the arming of
vessels of belligerents in American ports and other obligations of neutrality, which rules and
instructions were approved by Washington's Cabinet on August 3, more than three months
after the Proclamation. Id. at 365-67. It is these obligations on the part of private citizens to
which Washington referred when he said it "rests with the wisdom of Congress to correct,
improve or enforce this plan of procedure." It was not his policy of neutrality or his personal
interpretation of the treaties with France that he offered for Congress' judgment, but only so
much of his system as required legislation to fulfill, such as rules of prizes or revisions of the
criminal code. He himself had established policy as a prerogative of the Executive. 33 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 164-65 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1940).
76 The quotation is from one of the foremost authorities of this century on the law of
nations. Wright, Validity of the Proposed Reservations to the Peace Treaty, 20 COLUM. L.
REv. 121, 134 (1920). See also holding by Court of Claims that: "In time of war, the
Commander in Chief has the same powers as other civilized governments, and the exercise of
them need no ratification to give them effective force." The court was speaking of the un-
declared war in the Philippines. Warner, Barnes & Co. v. United States, 40 Ct. Cl. 1, 32(1904).
77 8 ANNALS OF CONoRESS 1269, 1410, 1445-46, 1451, 1454-55, 1457-59, 1462, 1477,
1521 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1851).
78 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1889).
79 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.




D. The Intent of the Founding Fathers
The contemporary setting in which the Constitution was drafted points to a
general understanding among most of the framers that the President would
possess and exercise an independent role as required by the national defense.8
Although it is almost forgotten today, at the time of the Constitutional Conven-
tion the country faced overwhelming foreign dangers. To the north, Britain was
illegally holding onto frontier military posts it had agreed to cede, and was sup-
porting Indian raiding attacks across our northern frontier. To the south,
Spain possessed New Orleans and posts at the mouth of the Mississippi and in
the Floridas. In the years immediately preceding the Convention, Spain had
ended the free navigation of American boats on the Mississippi, imposed special
tariffs for the deposit of goods in New Orleans, and plotted creation of an Indian
buffer state between Spanish possessions and the American border. Even our
erstwhile ally, France, was suspected by Jefferson of attempting to make the
United States a dependent client embroiled in French foreign conflicts. Added to
these threats was an awareness by the framers that the "extension of our own
commerce in our own vessels," as distant as "the trade to China and India,"
would invite hostility against our fleets and require our defense of "that com-
merce."
82
Admitting this existing state of things, W. Taylor Reveley contends that the
framers remedied this situation "by loosening the hold of individual states on
81 A recent major contribution to the law of foreign affairs arrives at exactly the op-
posite conclusion. Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The
Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SZTON HALL L. REV. 527 (1974).
Professor Arthur Bestor builds a painstaking case for the proposition that the framers of the
Constitution "validated a transfer" of the powers of war and peace from executive to legislative
hands "that had taken place a dozen years earlier and which they sought to modify in only a
very limited way." Id. at 563. His view is that the Constitutional Convention essentially
borrowed the principles of the Articles of Confederation by which every crucial decision of
foreign policy was to be arrived at through legislative deliberation. Id. at 568. Developing
his premise beyond the concept of mere joint participation of the two branches in the making
and carrying out of critical decisions, he argues that the majority and minority at the Con-
stitutional Convention "were in agreement on one point-that foreign policy should be
determined by legislative deliberation and that the executor of that policy should be the agent
of the legislature, bound by the instructions it formulated." Id. at 619.
Professor Bestor's impressively documented work deserves close attention, but an aware-
ness of basic differences in treatment may explain the divergent conclusions of that paper and
this one. Bestor (1) gives absolutely no weight to subsequent usage as a source of collateral
interpretation of the Constitution, id. at 663, (2) gives no notice to interpretations of the
foreign-affairs provisions of the Constitution by at least six members of the present Supreme
Court who have put forward the view that the President holds primary responsibility for
foreign affairs, see note 73 supra, (3) fails to consider evidence that the framers equated
"war" in the declaration clause with "Offensive" war, thus overlooking a meaning to that clause
beyond that of simply "communicating a warning or a notice to the enemy," which Bestor rules
out as "absurd," id. at 608-09, (4) neglects substantial contemporary evidence that the
framers knew of and blamed the Articles of Confederation for the system which allowed
Congress to dangerously interfere with the conduct and planning of military affairs during the
Revolution and the fact that the obvious remedy for this defeat was augmentation of executive
power, id. at 570-71, (5) ignores the significance of the shift in direction of state charters
towards giving the executive office greater powers of independent action for the public safety,
(6) fails to consider the implications of evidence the framers held strong fears of delegating
too much power to the Congress, and (7) is concerned with the entire field of foreign rela-
tions decisions, whereas this article is addressed solely to the power of determining on the use
and deployment of military force in defense of. important national interests.
82 L. KAPLAN, COLONIES INTO NATIONS 163-70, 179-80 (1972); cf. TrE FEDERALIST NoS.
4, 34 (A. Hamilton).
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congressional action and by restructuring Congress to make it a more viable
executive force." 3 Certainly the framers meant to correct the delays and de-
rangements in government that resulted from the neglect and inaction of the
13 independent sovereignties, each State exercising its own discretion over
matters of foreign affairs and national defense. But to stop here is to ignore the
totality of the problem and the obvious remedy.
The times called for swift and unified decisions on matters of foreign affairs,
as free as possible of transistory emotions. The framers recognized that the very
nature of deliberative legislative bodies would on occasion render Congress un-
equal to the vigorous action required. It is inconceivable that the framers
planned to meet the ominous foreign problems of the day by allowing a reluctant
or divided Legislature to block steps necessary for the public safety. Instead, they
understood that the Executive must in some instances take action on his own initi-
ative without awaiting specific authority from Congress.
It must be remembered that the framers had witnessed firsthand the in-
efficiency of the Continental Congress in the management of military affairs
during the War of Independence. Of the 55 framers who attended the Con-
stitutional Convention, no less than 30 had performed military duty in the Revo-
lution.84 These men knew that at the time of the American Revolution, Congress
had jointly possessed the powers of the executive and legislature. 5 They knew
that the directives of Congress had interfered with General Washington's opera-
tions and had nearly caused disaster.8"
It was the Continental Congress, for example, which twice decided on ab-
solutely impractical plans for attacking Canada, without consulting a single mili-
tary expert," and which by its resolution of October 11, 1776, influenced Gen-
eral Washington to defend a fort at Harlem Heights by "every art and whatever
expense," resulting in the loss of over 2,600 men.88 It was the Continental Con-
gress' order in the fall of 1777 which made it difficult for Washington to obtain
reinforcements from the Northern Army, thereby preventing him from saving
American forts on the Delaware River and allowing the British to open navi-
83 Reveley, Constitutional Allocation of the War Powers Between the President and
Congress: 1787-1788, 15 U. VA. J. INT. LAW 73, 83 (1974) (emphasis added).
84 See generally the sketches of each framer set forth in C. ROSSITER, 1787 THE GRAND
CONVENTION 79-137 (1966). At least six signers of the Constitution, in addition to Washing-
ton, were intimately familiar with the General's problems. Gouverneur Morris had defended
the Commander in Chief in Congress and had come to Valley Forge to see things for himself;
Thomas Miffln had been quartermaster general of Washingtons army; Robert Morris had
managed to finance Washington's campaign; Hamilton had served on Washington's staff and
stormed Yorktown; James McHenry had frozen at Valley Forge and become a secretary to
Washington; and General C. C. Pinckney had been an aide to Washington in the battles of
Germantown and Brandywine.
85 D. HIGINBOTHAm, THE WAR OF AmERICAN INDEPENDENCE 91-92 (1971); M. JENSEN,
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 266-69 (1940).
86 John Marshall, himself a contemporary observer, remarks: "Congress were disposed
to be regulated in their plans, rather by their wishes, than by the means placed in the hands
of their military commanders for the execution of them...." 3 J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 5 (AMS Press ed. 1969).
87 4 J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 30-41 (AMS Press ed. 1969).
88 2 J. MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 485-502 (AMS Press ed. 1969).
Washington wrote that the decision not to abandon the fort was "repugnant to my own judg-
ment." 2 J. FLExNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON 138, 145, 149 (1968).
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gation of the river for the supply of its army. 9 That Congress is also accountable
for the tragedy of Valley Forge. In August of 1777, the Continental Congress
threw out a military commissary-general chosen by Washington and assumed
charge of the commissariat for itself, erecting a system "in direct opposition to
the opinion of the commander in chief."'" John Marshall, who served with Gen-
eral Washington throughout the winter of 1777, observed in his authoritative
biography of Washington that "Congress persisted in their system, and the effects
of deranging, in the midst of a campaign, so important a department as that must
be which feeds the troops, were not long in unfolding themselves."92 Not only
was Washington's army prevented from making attacks on Howe's lines about
Philadelphia, but the lack of clothing, food, and blankets had tragic results as
cold weather came on. As summarized by one military historian: "The amount
of harm, caused by the unwise military control usurped by Congress, can only
be measured in terms of the appalling sufferings of the American soldiers at Val-
ley Forge . ."
The framers also held fresh memories of Shays' Rebellion of 1786-87, in
which Governor Bowdoin of Massachusetts had been required to singlehandedly
call out the militia and raise an army to restore order before the reluctant and
divided legislature could be moved to action. "Finding that the lenient mea-
sures which had been taken by the legislature, to subdue the resentments of the
insurgents, only enlarged their demands," Marshall relates, Governor Bowdoin
determined "on a vigorous exertion of all the powers he possessed, for the pro-
tection and defense of the commonwealth. Upwards of 4,000 militia were ordered
into service. . . ."" Since "the public treasury did not afford the means of keep-
ing this force in the field a single week," the Governor again took affairs in his
own hands, heading a number of citizens who financed the proposed expedition
entirely with private money. 6
A similar outbreak against a state government took place in New Hamp-
shire, when an armed mob surrounded the legislature and intimidated the legis-
lators.9" The rebellion "was crushed by the instant and vigorous exertions of
General [John] Sullivan, who was at the head of the executive of that state." 9
Sullivan personally ordered out the nearest companies of cavalry and infantry
89 T. FROTHINGHAM, WASHINGTON, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 228-30 (1930).
90 WATSON, supra note 59, at 912.
91 MARSHALL, supra note 86, at 276.
92 Id. at 277.
93 FROTHINGHAM, supra note 89, at 234.
94 News of the Governor's strong claim to and use of executive defense powers was
quickly spread in the public press. E.g., Boston Gazette, Jan. 29, Feb. 5, Feb. 12, 1787.
Massachusetts Gazette (Boston), Jan. 30, Feb. 6, Feb. 9, Feb. 20, 1787. Governor Bowdoin's
speech to the legislature explaining the necessity for "speedy and vigorous measures"
pursuant to the independent powers vested in him by the Constitution of the Commonwealth
is reprinted in the Boston Gazette, Feb. 5, 1787. Also see the reply of the legislature, in which
"the Senate and House of Representatives, in General Court assembled . . . take this earliest
opportunity to express their entire satisfaction in the measures you have been pleased to take,
pursuant to the powers vested in you by the Constitution, for the subduing a turbulent
spirit . . . ." Massachusetts Gazette, Feb. 6, 1787, at 1 (emphasis added).
95 MARSHALL, supra note 37, at 103. See also M. STARKEY, A LITTLE REBELLION 49,
186 (1955).
96 MARSHALL, supra note 37, at 104.
97 2 E. STACKPOLE, HISTORY or NEw HAMiSHIRE 243 (1916).
98 MARSHALL, supra note 37, at 95.
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and took command of the loyal troops.99 These disorders, and the way in which
they were handled by firm action of the executives, were known throughout the
American States. They certainly influenced the view of the framers as to the
nature of executive responsibility for the public safety and the necessity for hav-
ing at the head of government an officer who could have adequate independent
power to protect against armed threats to our lives, property, and government
itself.100
The Founding Fathers also had before them the example of recently estab-
lished state constitutions, such as those of Massachusetts (1780)1 and New
Hampshire (1784),12 which conferred far broader defense powers upon the
state executives than had earlier charters adopted in the immediate period of
the Revolution.0 Eight constitutions and two royal charters had been com-
pleted in the year of independence. The following year was marked by the
adoption of three more constitutions. These charters generally provided for a
weak executive and reflected the animosity then prevailing towards King
George.' It is striking that each of the two state charters revised in the 1780's,
when the drafters worked in a less prejudicial atmosphere and had the advantage
of wartime experience under the weak laws, allotted strong military defense
powers to the executive. A comparison of these two later charters with the orig-
inal 13 reveals the same dramatic shift of powers to the executive as is manifest
in the transition from the Articles of Confederation to the Federal Constitution.'
99 STACKPOLE, supra note 97, at 244.
100 Reveley would deny the significance of these executive initiatives by compartmentalizing
the concerns of the Framers into two independent categories, one involving their concern with
"purely domestic tranquility," and the other their considerations of foreign affairs. REVELEY,
supra note 83, at 94. The framers themselves made no such narrow distinctions. General
Henry Knox, then Secretary at War, wrote Washington that as a result of these disorders:
"Men of reflection and principle are determined to endeavour and to establish a government
... which will be efficient in cases of internal commotions or foreign invasions." Liberty was
at stake; whether the threat be from domestic or external sources made no difference.
MARSHALL, supra note 37, at 98. Also see the references to "dangers from foreign arms and
influence," "hostilities from abroad," "dangers from foreign force," "dangers from abroad,"
and dangers ... from the arms and arts of foreign nations," warned against in THE FEDERALIST
Nos. 3-6 (A. Hamilton).
101 B, PooRn, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Pt. I, 965-66 (1972).
102 Id., Pt. II, at 1288.
103 Although Hamilton states, in THE FEDERALIST No. 69, that "it may well be a question,"
whether the Constitutions of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, "do not, in this instance,
confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than could be claimed by a President of
the United States," it must be remembered he was trying to "sell" the Federal Constitution
to the public. Hamilton does not flatly say the President is given less powers. He merely
observes that "it may well be a question." He does not mention how serious a question it is
or indicate how it shall be answered. Nor does he catalogue the powers of the governors so
we can know which aspects of those powers may be in question. For example, the Executives
may have possessed powers regarding martial law or the raising of armies which the President
does not have.
104 H. CUSHING, HISTORY OF THE TRANSITION FROM PROVINCIAL TO COMMONWEALTH
GOVERNMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS 10-12 (AMS Press ed. 1969); 2 H. PILLSBURY, NEW
HAMPSHIRE 329 (1927).
105 Raoul Berger points out that the constitutions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire
provded that the Executive shall exercise the powers of commander in chief "agreeably to the
es and regulations of the constitution and the laws of the land and not otherwise." He
argues from this that the Executive was "subject to governance by the legislature." Berger,
War-Making by the President, 121 HARv. L. Rzv. 31, 37 n.67 (1972). Berger makes an
assumption that is unsupported. He offers no legislative history regarding adoption of these
Constitutions and no court decision of either of the two States so interpreting the above phrase.
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The trend toward a strong executive was reflected in ways other than the
new constitutions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. In 1780, the Con-
tinental Congress requested the several state legislatures to invest the executive
authority "with powers sufficiently ample" to comply with such applications as
might be made to them by a committee of Congress from camp with General
Washington. 0 6 Marshall reports that: "Under the impressions produced by
these representations, some of the state legislatures vested extensive powers in the
executive . ,,."" The following year Congress reformed the organization of its
executive functions, consolidating power into fewer hands.
From an ill-judged prejudice against institutions which had been sanctioned
by experience, all the great executive duties had heretofore devolved, either
on committees of Congress, or on boards consisting of several members....
But the scantiness of the national means at length surmounted the prejudices
which had so long prevailed; the several committees and boards yielded to
a secretary for foreign affairs, a superintendent of finance, a secretary of
war, and a secretary of marine. 08
Thus, an impartial review of the history of this early period reveals that
the attitudes of the majority of persons who wrote the state constitutions had
undergone a change from an initial dread of the royalty in the 1770's to a per-
ception of the need for a strong executive by the 1780's. Experience had by then
established the validity of the position that nothing short of conferring upon the
Executive an independent power for defense of the nation's safety would ensure
the preservation of its freedoms.
Those who would dwell upon the concern of the Founders with a mo-
narchial Presidency would do well to study the fear our forefathers had of an un-
regulated Congress. James Wilson instructed his law class in 1790 that "[t]o
control the power and conduct of the legislature by an over-ruling constitution,
was an improvement in the science and practice of government reserved to the
American States."'"" Jefferson, in language quoted in the Federalist, depicted
congressional government as being the equivalent of "despotic government.""' 0
Nor has a study of available materials by the author turned up any support for Berger's premise.
On the other hand, contemporary interpretations of the Constitutions by the Executives, and
accepted by the Legislatures of each State during the two emergencies which arose in 1786
show that they construed their powers broadly. See text at notes 94-100 supra. All that the
provision on its face conveys is the statement that the Executive shall act agreeably to the
rules and regulations of the Constitution and laws of the land, whatever they may be. It
does not define or describe those rules and regulations. If the Constitution confers indepen-
dent and exclusive defense powers on the Commander in Chief, as applied in the crises of
1786-87, then that is the law of the land. Berger would rewrite the provision to read that
the Executive "shall at all times be subject to whatever rules and regulations the legislature
may enact, and the legislature shall have power, notwithstanding any other provision of this
constitution, to define the powers of the Executive as Commander-in-Chief." This, how-
ever, is not what the language reads.
106 MARSHALL, supra note 87, at 248.
107 Id. at 250-51.
108 Id. at 404-05.
109 THE WORKS OF JAMES WLSON 770 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
110 THE FEDERAULST No. 48 (A. Hamilton), quoting from Jefferson's Notes on Virginia,
printed in Paris in 1784 for distribution among his friends in Europe and America and printed
in England in 1787. The pertinent text is in 2 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 162-165
(B. Lipscomb-Bergh ed. 1903).
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He said: "It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plu-
rality of hands, and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots
would surely be as oppressive as one." ' Consistent with this theme is the his-
tory published by John Adams in 1787, which was much circulated at the
Constitutional Convention and undoubtedly contributed to the opinions of the
members. 12 This work concludes:
If there is one certain truth to be collected from the history of all ages, it
it this; that the people's rights and liberties, and the democratical mixture
in a constitution, can never be preserved without a strong executive, or, in
other words, without separating the executive from the legislative power.113
If the framers, contrary to this concern with vesting excessive power in the
Legislature and contrary to their recognition of the inadequacies of the Legislature
in deliberating upon and conducting defensive war, meant to provide Congress
with the entire panoply of war powers--the sole power to decide when to em-
ploy the Armed Forces, the power to compel a halt to any military activity already
begun, the power to define or limit the geographical areas where the forces shall
be deployed and even to set numerical limits upon deployments in specified
areas-they certainly had a perfect model before them in the Articles of Con-
federation. Article IX of the Confederation conferred upon the Continental
Congress the "sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and
war." The fact that the Constitutional Convention turned away from this clear-
cut language, voting to remove from Congress the power to make "peace" 1 4
and changing the power of "determining on" war to the sole power "to declare"
war,1 5 is persuasive evidence that the framers intended the legislative branch to
have less authority over military matters than it possessed under the Articles.
Another contemporary model the framers could have followed, but did not,
was article 26 of the South Carolina constitution of 1776, which specifically
restrained the executive by prescribing that the "governor and commander-in-
chief shall have no power to commence war, or conclude peace, or enter into
any final treaty without the consent of the Senate and house of represen-
tatives." ' Again, one might ask why, if the framers meant to make the Execu-
tive no more than the "agent" of the Legislature in matters of military affairs,
did they not say so in clear words of the kind they had available for use?
IV. Limits to Presidential War Power
A. The Powers of Congress Distinguished
In the famous book which first formulated the war powers of this nation,
William Whiting wrote:
111 Id. at 163.
112 1 J. ADAMS, A DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AuMCA (1787), reprinted in 4 THE WORxs oF JOHN ADAMS (C. Adams ed.
1851).
113 Id. at 290.
114 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 319 (M. Farrand ed. 1937)
[hereinafter cited as 1787 REcoRas].
115 Id. at 318-19.
116 Poore, supra note 101, Pt. II, at 1625-26.
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Congress may effectually control the military power by refusing to vote
supplies, or to raise troops, and by impeachment of the President; but for
the military movements and measures essential to overcome the enemy-for
the general conduct of the war-the President is responsible to, and con-
trolled, by no other department of government .... 117
He added that the Constitution "does not prescribe any territorial limits, within
the United States, to which his military operations shall be restricted." '
Dr. John Pomeroy, Dean of the New York University Law School in the
1860's, similarly rejected the idea that "the disposition and management of the
land and naval forces would be in the hands of Congress. . . .""' "The policy
of the Constitution is very different," Pomeroy instructed. The Legislature may
"furnish the requisite supplies of money and materials" and "authorize the rais-
ing of men," but "all direct management of warlike operations.. . are as much
beyond the jurisdiction of the legislature, as they are beyond that of any assem-
blage of private citizens."' 20
Congress has great powers over military matters. It controls the size and the
strength of the Armed Forces and the amounts and kinds of materials with which
war is waged.' Congress can provide or refuse to provide a multitude of emer-
gency powers involving foreign trade and strategic materials. 2  Congress can
117 W. WHITING, THE WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 163-64 (Rio Grande Press ed.
1971).
118 Id. at 166.
119 J. POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 288-89 (1870).
120 Id. at 289.
121 To the framers the power of the purse was an extremely effective check on going to
war. In the early years of the Republic, it was possible to conceive of no navy and almost
no army. In fact, Washington had a regular army of only 672 in 1789, 1,216 in 1790, and
2,128 in 1791. 6 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 2073 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1849); R. WEIGLEY,
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 89 (1967). Congress could put an entire clamp on
the means of making war by the simple and then practical method of not raising forces. That
this is exactly how the first Congresses viewed the power is shown in the Act of March 27, 1794,
which authorized a small naval force for protection of trade of the United States against
Algerine cruisers. Section nine of this law provided that "if a peace shall take place between
the United States and the Regency of Algiers, that no farther [sic] proceeding be had under this
act." 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 1428 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1849). Thus, there was no
navy, except for this one emergency.
Similarly an amendment proposed in,1794 by Congressman Sedgwick to a bill providing
for the raising of auxiliary troops would have required that the force shall be completely
disbanded if no war shall break out with any European power within two years and six months
after the time for their enlistment begins. Although the amendment did not pass, it reflects
the understanding of our forefathers as to how war was to be controlled. Id. at 500-04. Con-
gress did not pass policy rules seeking to restrict the President's discretion as to why or where
the military forces were to be employed. Congress reduced the size of those forces, if it wanted
to restrain the President. When an effort was made to control the first President's discretion,
it was defeated as has been every similar attempt in Congress up to the 1970's. Id. at 1221.
Also, it is instructive to consider Gouverneur Morris' argument at the Constitutional
Convention that "if a majority of the Senate be for peace, and are not allowed to make it,
they will be apt to effect their purpose in the more disagreeable mode, of negativing the
supplies for the war." RECORDS, supra note 114, at 548. If the option of reducing the size
of the forces or curtailing supplies is no longer adequate, in the opinion of those who want
stronger control over Presidential discretion, the way to change the situation is by a con-
stitutional amendment, not by reading into the Constitution powers for Congress which the
framers never comprehended.
122 See generally, e.g., OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRES-
IDENT, GUIDE TO EMERGENCY POWERS CONFERRED BY LAWS IN EFFECT ON JANUARY 1, 1969
(1969). This book compiles 284 national emergency laws in effect on January 1, 1969. The
House of Representatives acted to greatly reduce the President's authorities with respect to
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approve or reject treaties or area-resolutions having defense implications.1 21
Ultimately, the impeachment power is available if a President should commit an
irresponsible abuse of a constitutional discretion.' But once Congress has decided
how many men should be drafted, or what arms should be constructed, history
indicates that the President may station those men and send out those arms to
such parts of the world as he determines appropriate in the national defense,
without any geographical or time limitations imposed by Congress.
One constitutional provision which is claimed to vest the final decision of
going to war with Congress is the declaration of war clause. 2 But the idea
that a declaration of war is a necessary condition for the waging of war is a myth.
Actually, the power to declare was viewed as one of the least important war
powers by political figures of the 18th century. According to the contemporary
meaning and usage given to declaration of war, it served as an official proclama-
tion of solemn, public war or as an initial step of commencing "offensive" war.
By comparison, the power of the purse and the power of limiting the supplies
national emergencies by passing H.R. 3884 of the 94th Congress. 121 CONG. REc. H. 8341
(daily ed. Sept. 4, 1975).
123 Approximately 52 hostilities arguably have been authorized by treaties. Emerson,
supra note 52, app. G., at 117-19.
124 It is important to remember that the original language of the "high crimes and Mis-
demeanors" phrase, accepted by the Constitutional Convention, included the descriptive
words "against the United States." The Committee on Style and Arrangement dropped the
latter words, but without any authority or intent of changing the substance of the provision.
1787 R coPDs, supra note 114, at 550. Thus, impeachment was seen as a category of offenses
against the state-political crimes.
During an earlier discussion in the Convention regarding impeachment, Edmund
Randolph stated that the "propriety of impeachments was a favorite principle with him"
because the "Executive will have great opportunities of abusing his power, particularly in
time of war when the military force and in some respects the public money will be in his
hands." Id. at 67. This indicates a recognition both that the President would possess broad
war powers and that his exercise of discretion would still remain a subject of possible check
by the process of impeachment.
Alexander Hamilton wrote in THE FEDERALIST No. 65 that the jurisdiction of the Senate
in cases of impeachment "are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public
men, or in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature
which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL as they relate chiefly to in-juries done immediately to the society itself." See also Bestor, Reviews: Impeachment,
49 WASH. L. Rxv. 255 (1973); Broderick, What Are Impeachable Offenses?, 60 A.B.A.J.
415 (1974); Broderick, The Politics of Impeachment, 60 A.B.A.J. 554 (1974).
125 U.S. CoNs-. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
James Wilson, one of six men who signed both the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitution and one of the original Justices of the Supreme Court, instructed his law
students in 1792 that the Constitution of the United States renews the principles of govern-
ment known in England before the Norman conquest by which "the power of making peace
and war was invariably possessed by the [legislative body]." WILSON, supra note 109, at 433.
Earlier in the same lectures Wilson had pointed out that it is a part of the law of
nations that a "state ought to attend to the preservation of its own existence." Id. at 151,
154. Further he declared: "The same principles, which evince the right of a nation to do
every thing, which it lawfully may, for the preservation of its members, evince its right, also,
to avoid and prevent, as much as it lawfully may, every thing which would load it with
injuries or threaten it with danger." Id. at 156.
Would the framers violate one of the cardinal duties of a nation, which Wilson be-
lieves is obligatory upon it by the law of nature? If Wilson's reference to the war-making
power of Congress is considered an all-encompassing statement, the nation would be helpless
to preserve itself whenever a threat exists that the legislature, for one reason or another, is
reluctant "to avoid and prevent." Considering the enormous problems which the Framers
faced, including serious dangers of internal disorders and foreign pressures, both military and
economic, and believing the framers were practicable men who strived for a workable charter
that would endure, it is believed that Wilson did not mean to deny an independent power in
the executive of reaction against serious foreign menace.
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and size of the Armed Forces were by far the major means of controlling
the occurrence of hostilities. To read the declaration clause to mean that no
defensive war or other reaction can be commenced without a specific author-
ization by Congress is to confer a meaning upon that clause which nowhere
appears in the Constitution and to give it a purpose which the framers never
intended.
The vast majority of wars are begun without any declaration. This was as
true in the Founding Fathers' day as it is today. In the 87 years preceding the
Constitutional Convention, 38 wars were waged in the Western World; only one
was preceded by a declaration.'26 That the Founders knew of this condition is
proven by Hamilton's statement in the Federalist No. 25 that declarations of war
were already in disuse in the 18th century. When the Constitutional Convention
narrowed the scope of Congress' war power by substituting "declare" for "make"
in the declaration of war clause,' 27 the framers must have understood that there
had been and would continue to be many instances in which hostilities would
occur without declaration.
The framers did give a meaning to the declaration clause, but it was essen-
tially concerned with "offensive" war, 2' the distinction between offensive and
defensive wars being well known by the framers. 2 ' For example, Hamilton, in
the second of eight papers written under the pseudonym "Pacificus," explained
that had the United States assisted France in 1793 instead of remaining neutral,
we would have engaged in offensive war, since France was then a belligerent
nation in Europe."3 By the law of nations, as compiled by authorities known to
the framers, a declaration of war was not required for defensive war. 3' Of
course, the framers meant to check Presidents from engaging in wars of aggression
and conquest, but they also knew from experience that a nation must attend to
its own survival, and that as a consequence there was needed an ultimate author-
ity who could act in defense of the country.
Another power relied upon by spokesmen for congressional supremacy in
the field of war powers is the "necessary and proper" clause of article I. It is not
believed Congress can restrain Presidential defensive operations under the guise
of this provision. To the contrary, William Whiting counseled President Lincoln
that Congress is "bound to pass such laws as will aid him" in carrying into
126 L. MAURICE, HOSTnITIES WITHOUT A DECLARATION OF WAR 12-27 (1883).
127 1787 RECORDS, supra, note 114, at 319.
128 The "usual contests of Empire and Ambition," with which the framers were familiar,
were "waged by a ruling prince to extend his dominions, or settle a dynastic squabble, or
secure a commercial advantage." HIGOINBOTHAM, supra note 85, at 103, quoting and inter-
preting a writing of George Washington's. These are the aims of warfare that characterized
"offensive" war, and that the Framers meant to prevent absent legislative collaboration.
The declaration also serves the purpose of making it known to our citizens and the
world that our nation is in the condition of war. WHiTrNo, supra note 117, at 39-40; WOLFF,
supra note 71, at 364-66.
129 E.g., the letter addressed by President Washington to his Cabinet on April 18, 1793,
regarding the means of maintaining a neutrality in the war commenced between France and
Great Britain, included two questions specifically addressed to the distinctions of "offensive!'
from "defensive" war. MARSHALL, supra note 37, at 329.
130 7 WORKS OF HAMILTON 86-87 (J. C. Hamilton ed. 1851).
131 VATTEL, supra note 71, at 316; Wolff, supra note 71, at 368. See N. GROTHUS, ON THE
LAw OF WAR AND PEACE 57, 184 (1925 reprint of 1646 ed.).
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execution his military powers." 2 Congressional measures under the necessary
and proper clause must be in aid of the functions of the President as Commander
in Chief; they cannot restrict his exercise of those functions. 3 This interpreta-
tion of the Constitution is supported by Myers v. United States"4 in which the
Supreme Court held that Congress could not limit the President's discretion of
removal of Executive Officers even though Congress itself created those offices.
Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, emphasized that Congress cannot vary
the exercise of the President's distinctive powers. This, he said, "would be a dele-
gation by the [Constitutional] Convention to Congress of the function of defining
the primary boundaries of another of the three great divisions of government." ' 5
The Court also took a restrictive view of the necessary and proper clause in
Kinsella v. Singleton.' There it held the clause "is not a grant of power," but
merely removes the uncertainty that Congress may implement the powers other-
wise vested by the Constitution. 3 7
In the same vein, neither can Congress use its power of appropriation to
legislate policy restrictions over the conduct of the President's defense powers.
This would be placing "the keys of the Treasury and the command of the army
into the same hands," something that Madison rejected in Federalist No. 37 as
being "particularly dangerous" and therefore unintended by the Constitutional
Convention. If the Constitution does give the President authority to protect
American rights and interests abroad, Congress cannot by a mere appropriation
rider redefine the allotment of powers made by the framers.'
B. Accountability of the War Power: The Constitution and the Media
Referring to the concept of allowing the President to wage defensive war
on his own decision, Abraham Lincoln, when a first-term Congressman, asked,
"Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect." ie added,
"no one man" should hold the power of bringing the oppression of war upon
us.' Lincoln withdrew his opinion in part 15 years later by writing, "When
rebellion or invasion comes, the decision is to be made," and the man whom the
people have made the Commander in Chief "is the man who holds the power
and bears the responsibility of making it."'"" But his original question requires
an answer.
One reply is that the concept put forward does not give an unrestrained
power to the President to do anything he wants ie cannot conduct a war of
aggression. He cannot bully another country with threats of armed action simply
132 WHImT , supra note 117, at 33 (emphasis added).
133 POMEROY, supra note 119, at 289.
134 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
135 Id. at 127.
136 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
137 1d. at 247.
138 There is little casb law pertinent to the military defense powers discussed in this article.
The fundamental fact is the Supreme Court has never ordered any ongoing military action
to stop. The author adopts by reference his analysis of the few possibly relevant cases set forth
in Emerson, supra note 52, at 61-69; Emerson, supra note 68, at 812-13.
139 See SCLEsmGZR, supra note 50, at 54 (emphasis added).
140 Id. at 72.
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because he does not like its tariff policies or the way it governs its internal affairs.
His constitutional power of independent action is limited to the defense of the
nation, its citizens, and its freedoms. One principle that is clear in every writing
or speech of the Founding Fathers is that they meant to curb the self-destructive
wars of aggression that marked the rule of the European nations. This explains
why the President's independent use of force can be invoked only for purposes
of defense.
The President's actions are checked by. the constitutional system of account-
ability. He must, under current practice, come to Congress at least once a year,
and usually more often, for funds to maintain and equip the Armed Forces. In
this connection, Congress has the right and resources to conduct extensive in-
vestigations into the state of the nation's defense arsenal, the strategy and assump-
tions that underlie American foreign policy and defense, and the general role
of the United States in the world. 4 ' If Congressmen and Senators disagree with
the basic assumptions that support the nation's defense policies or the kinds of
commitments the Government makes and guarantees, they can slash funds for
the programs and weapons systems which implement these policies.'4 2
Congress' opportunity to bring a different viewpoint to the electorate
through the news media should not be underestimated as a means of control
over the Executive. The chambers of each House contain attentive press galleries;
sound and television studios are located in the Capitol. If members are not
solicited to give their opinions, each invariably has a full-time assistant on his or
her personal staff who is responsible for the preparation and issuance of press
releases to the newspaper, wire service, periodical, and television rooms situated
in the Capitol, heralding the legislator's position. A news desk is an ever-present
sight at all open committee hearings, which offers members another means of
making public their own alternative policies. With the news media's preference
for controversy, the legislator critical of the Executive or possessed with a contrary
plan of action is reasonably assured of coverage.
Nor should the importance of the press as an institution in its own right
be slighted. The power of the press to influence decisions is also visible in the
many unofficial gatherings held in Washington, where the roles of bureaucrat
aid newsman are reversed; reporters and journalists become the briefers and
the speakers, who dispense information and opinions to audiences of high level
executive branch officials and congressional aides. Investigative reporting, too,
has taken on a scope and significance that rival or surpass the fact-finding
efforts of Congress itself.
What does this mean? In the words of a critic of a rampant Presidency:
"Through history the media of mass opinion-newspapers and, in more recent
years, radio and television-had provided an unwritten check on Caesarism."'"4
141 E.g., the Senate reserved two days for exactly such a "great debate" regarding U.S.
commitments overseas and the nation's defense needs on June 2 and 3, 1975. 121 CoNG. RaE.
S 9177-254 (daily ed. June 2, 1975), S 9404-92 (daily ed. June 3, 1975).
142 Congress is already applying a greater axe to the defense budget than is generally
understood. Defense is now receiving its smallest share of the federal budget since 1940,
about 27 per cent, and the smallest proportion of the gross national product since 1950, about
6 per cent. 121 CONG. REc. S 14747 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975).
143 SCHLESINGER, supra note 50, at 219.
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Indeed, the Vietnam war is an example of how the force of public opinion
worked to end the spiral of escalation of the American fighting role in Indochina.
When the majority of the American people and their elected representatives in
Congress stopped backing the war, it was ended.
Our forefathers knew that the 40 some newspapers published between 1775
and 1783 helped to unify the patriots during the American Revolution and to
stiffen their resolve to last the war out to its successful conclusion.14 They real-
ized that the media deserved much of the credit for the remarkable fact that 11
states approved the Constitution within 10 months after the end of the Conven-
tion of 1787."" In the nationwide debate preceding the adoption of the Con-
stitution, 90 of the 100 newspapers then published supported ratification." 6 The
early magazines of America also helped to mold public opinion for the Federal
Charter." '7
The point that must not be missed in all the criticism of the supposed lack
of accountability on the part of the Executive is the enormous influence the press
has had in affecting the course of history. We should not discount the opinion
of George Washington, who credited the wide circulation of the printed word
as being "the security of a free Constitution.""' 8 And when all else fails, there
remains the check of impeachment, which is meant to be a viable safeguard
against political offenses, such as an irresponsible abuse by a Chief Executive
of a constitutional discretion." 9
V. Conclusion
With time, public opinion or Congress will curtail or remove from office a
President who oversteps the bounds of his emergency war powers. It is
the people who have the last word. They can either reject the President as a
candidate in the next election or act through their Congressmen to impeach
and remove him from office. So long as he holds office, however, the Constitution,
as designed by the framers and interpreted in the course of history, does not
permit Congress to prescribe the situations, length of time, or places when or
where the President can use the Armed Forces in defense of the nation and the
constitutional guarantees of liberty and safety for the American people.
In summary, President Ford acted in conformity to the War Powers Resolu-
tion and consistently with a long line of precedents set by his predecessors when
144 2 THE CAwBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 176-178 (1933). Dr. David
Ramsay, a contemporary historian of the period, believed the "press had a merit equal to
that of the sword" in winning the War of Independence. 2 D. RAMSAY, THE HSTORY OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 319 (1968 reprint of London ed. of 1793). See generally A.
SCHLESINGER, JR., PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE (1957) (detailed study of the role newspapers
as engines of opinion pushing the colonists along the road to independence from the Sugar Act
of 1764 onward).
145 C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 306 (1966).
146 R. RUTLAND, THE NEWSMONGERS 58-59 (1973).
147 L. RICHARDSON, A HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN MAGAZINES 1741-1789, at 3-4, 238,
250-52, 260-62, 317-19 (1931).
148 The quote is from Washington's first annual address to Congress, I ANNALS OF CON-
GRESS 970 (Gales & Seaton ed. 1834).
149 See note 124 supra.
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he committed United States military forces in defense of American evacuees and
related foreign nationals from the war zones of Indochina, and when he upheld
the safety of American citizens and the freedom of the seas for American vessels
by rescuing the Mayaguez and its crew. But even if his actions had been in open
conflict with the War Powers Resolution, it would have made no legal difference;
and although some future Presidential undertaking may involve far more than
a short-lived action to rescue citizens, or may run afoul of a specific concurrent
resolution of the Congress aimed at halting the President's use of the armed
forces, the President can legally continue whatever defensive measure he believes
is justified. To the extent it limits the President's independent defense powers,
then, the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional.
